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1375 
ENTERING LIBERTY’S REFUGE  
(SOME ASSEMBLY REQUIRED) 
GREGORY P. MAGARIAN

 
The opportunity to introduce this exchange about Professor John 
Inazu’s Liberty’s Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly1 confers a 
daunting privilege. Giving a decent account of someone else’s argument 
always makes for rough going, and the task becomes especially difficult 
when the argument features as much detail and nuance as Inazu has 
packed into Liberty’s Refuge. This brief discussion of a book I greatly 
admire, by an author I am fortunate to know as a colleague and a friend, 
cannot hope to capture all of the book’s important and interesting 
contributions. I will simply describe three of the book’s primary facets. 
Liberty’s Refuge is, first, a work of intellectual history: Inazu seeks to 
recover from history’s tall grass a legally respected Anglo-American 
tradition of assembly. The book is also a work of constitutional 
interpretation and legal analysis: Inazu aims to revitalize the right of 
assembly for our time, critiquing the legal decisions that he sees as having 
buried or distorted assembly and charting a path toward renewed 
constitutional protection for assembly. Finally, the book is a work of 
normative political and legal theory: Inazu’s legal analysis reflects his 
powerful normative commitment to the autonomy of groups—assemblies 
of all manner, size, and repute—that counter the state’s power and allow 
individuals to define themselves through engagement with others. That all 
sounds rosy, and in many ways, it is. But Inazu’s argument leads him into 
challenging and highly fraught terrain. 
As intellectual history, Liberty’s Refuge traces the origins, rise, and 
decline of the right of assembly. Inazu offers a rich account of the crucial 
role assembly played in forming and strengthening our society from the 
founding of the republic through the 1940s. He explains how the 
abolitionist movement, the movement for women’s suffrage, and the 
progressive and labor movements of the early 20th century drew 
inspiration and strength from the right of assembly.
2
 Legal protection for 
assembly allowed these dissident groups to pool their members’ strength 
in order to challenge established arrangements of social and political 
power. The law took a wrong turn, in Inazu’s view, during what he calls 
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the national security era of the 1950s and the Civil Rights Era that 
followed. National security concerns associated with the Cold War led the 
government to suppress assemblies by communists and left-wingers.
3
 
Then the Civil Rights Movement, in Inazu’s portrayal, gradually moved 
from an emphasis on including African Americans in society to an 
emphasis on barring white-controlled groups from excluding them.
4
 These 
two developments allowed a new legal concept, the freedom of 
association, to depose the right of assembly.  
Inazu’s critique of the freedom of association animates Liberty’s 
Refuge as a work of constitutional interpretation and legal analysis. He 
emphasizes that the text of the First Amendment refers to assembly, not 
association, and he argues that association makes a less robust and less 
desirable basis for constitutional protection than assembly.
5
 In particular, 
Inazu criticizes freedom of association doctrine for focusing on two 
narrow ideas: expressive association and intimate association.
6
 The 
Supreme Court, beginning in the late 1950s, decided that groups mattered, 
for purposes of their constitutional autonomy, if they expressed coherent, 
usually political messages (e.g., the NAACP)
7
 or if they embodied 
intimate relationships (e.g., families).
8
 The Court did not accord 
constitutional protection to groups that it did not see as performing these 
functions (e.g., social clubs).
9
  
 
 
 3. Id. at 63–77. 
 4. Id. at 77–96. 
 5. Id. at 3–4. 
 6. Id. at 135–49. 
 7. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (noting that ―the Court has recognized 
a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—
speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution 
guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other 
individual liberties.‖); see, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding 
that the NAACP did not have to turn over its membership list to the state of Alabama because its 
members had a ―constitutionally protected right of association‖); see also INAZU, supra note 1, at 77–
85 (discussing NAACP v. Alabama). 
 8. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617–18, 620–21 (noting that ―the Court has concluded that choices 
to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue 
intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom 
that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives protection 
as a fundamental element of personal liberty. . . . Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep 
attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only 
a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of 
one’s life.‖); see, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 
(1980); see also INAZU, supra note 1, at 136–38 (discussing Karst’s The Freedom of Intimate 
Association). 
 9. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617–29 (upholding the application of state antidiscrimination law to 
require a social club, which the Court characterized as neither an expressive nor an intimate 
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For Inazu, these two doctrinal categories miss a great deal of what 
really matters about a wide range of groups: their distinctive 
characteristics, their importance in forming individual identities, and their 
role in strengthening communal bonds among individuals. More 
fundamentally, the Court’s freedom of association doctrine, by focusing 
on what groups do, misses the significance of groups’ formation and their 
very existence as social counterweights to established political power.
10
 
Inazu’s critique of association doctrine leads to incisive and thoughtful 
critiques of some key, generally well-regarded Supreme Court decisions, 
notably Roberts v. United States Jaycees
11
 (for which Inazu provides a 
―missing dissent‖)12 and the recent case of Christian Legal Society v. 
Martinez.
13
 Both of those decisions, in Inazu’s portrayal, reify the state’s 
commitment to nondiscrimination norms at an unacceptable cost to group 
autonomy. 
The conflict between assembly and nondiscrimination drives Liberty’s 
Refuge as a work of normative political and legal theory. Inazu portrays a 
world in which concerns about discrimination have taken on hegemonic 
political importance, leading the government—with the Court’s 
acquiescence—to force groups into accepting members the groups would 
prefer to exclude.
14
 The intellectual villains in this story are advocates of 
political consensus, notably Robert Dahl
15
 and John Rawls,
16
 whose vision 
of liberal pluralism Liberty’s Refuge portrays as promoting social harmony 
while subordinating groups’ role as counterweights to state power. 
 
 
association, to admit women as regular members); see also INAZU, supra note 1, at 132–36 (discussing 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees). 
 10. See, e.g., INAZU, supra note 1, at 2 (―The central argument of this book is that something 
important is lost when we fail to grasp the connection between a group’s formation, composition, and 
existence and its expression.‖); id. at 4 (―The forgetting of assembly and the embrace of association 
thus marked the loss of meaningful protections for the dissenting, political, and expressive group.‖); 
id. at 5 (noting that his social vision of assembly ―provides a buffer between the individual and the 
state that facilitates a check against centralized power‖). 
 11. See supra note 9. 
 12. INAZU, supra note 1, at 173–84. 
 13. 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978, 2985 (2010) (concluding that the Christian Legal Society’s 
―expressive-association and free-speech arguments merge‖ and upholding UC Hastings’ policy 
requiring all student groups, as a condition of receiving official recognition, to comply with the 
school’s nondiscrimination policy because such a condition was ―a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral 
condition on access to the student-organization forum‖); see INAZU, supra note 1, at 145–49 
(discussing CLS v. Martinez).  
 14. See INAZU, supra note 1, at 141–49.  
 15. See id. at 100–09. See generally ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 
(1956); ROBERT DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND DISSENT 
(1967). 
 16. See INAZU, supra note 1, at 129–31, 154–55. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE (Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (1971); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1995). 
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Resisting this tendency, Inazu offers a normative theory of the right of 
assembly, which he defines as ―a presumptive right of individuals to form 
and participate in peaceable, noncommercial groups. This right is 
rebuttable when there is a compelling reason for thinking that the 
justifications for protecting assembly do not apply (as when the group 
prospers under monopolistic or near-monopolistic conditions).‖17 
From other quarters, normative arguments for the values Inazu 
promotes sometimes emerge as strident, shrill rallying cries. In contrast, 
Liberty’s Refuge displays a rare nuance of thought and moderation of tone, 
even as Inazu steadfastly promotes his theory of assembly. For those of us 
who advocate strong antidiscrimination laws, several caveats in Inazu’s 
formulation deserve emphasis. He highlights the First Amendment’s 
requirement that constitutionally protected assembly must be peaceable.
18
 
He proffers the distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
assemblies as a political compromise to foreclose some potentially thorny 
disputes.
19
 Perhaps the most interesting caveat is Inazu’s exclusion of 
monopolistic or near-monopolistic groups from constitutional protection. 
This exclusion leads him to question Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,
20
 a 
decision whose preference for group autonomy over gay rights might seem 
to epitomize the values of Inazu’s assembly theory. Inazu, however, 
expresses concern about the result because of the Boy Scouts’ distinctive 
social significance. The Boy Scouts does not simply stand alongside other 
groups similarly situated; rather, it provides a unique opportunity for 
social belonging that attracts a great many people and benefits from 
government support. Inazu suggests that such a group’s autonomy interest 
might properly yield to the social benefits of greater inclusiveness.
21
 These 
caveats render Inazu’s assembly theory both provocative and circumspect; 
it challenges the legal primacy of liberal values of toleration without 
wholly subordinating those values. Inazu, like many political liberals who 
may resist his prescriptions, wants to create conditions for ordinary people 
to challenge established power. 
 
 
 17. INAZU, supra note 1, at 166. 
 18. Id. at 166–67 (noting that the text of the First Amendment protects ―the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble‖ (emphasis added)). 
 19. Id. at 167–68.  
 20. 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that the Boy Scouts, as an expressive association, had a right to 
exclude an openly gay scoutmaster from their membership); see INAZU, supra note 1, at 143–44 
(discussing Boy Scouts of America v. Dale).  
 21. See INAZU, supra note 1, at 251 n.36 (―Of all the litigants to bring cases about group 
autonomy to the Supreme Court in the past thirty years . . . the Scouts are arguably the litigants least 
worthy of the constitutional protections of assembly.‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/4
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My own deep admiration for Liberty’s Refuge does the book no great 
credit, except for one important fact: I remain strongly skeptical about 
some of Inazu’s core claims. Not many works of legal analysis or political 
theory can win devoted fans among their normative critics. Let me very 
briefly sketch two of my most substantial objections.  
First, I question Inazu’s rigid conception of, and decisive reliance on, 
the public-private distinction.
22
 In his juxtaposition of assembly and 
nondiscrimination, assembly represents beleaguered private aspiration 
while nondiscrimination norms reflect oppressive state hegemony. That 
stark dichotomy does not ring true for me. Historically, nondiscrimination 
norms have resisted hegemonic power, while assemblies of nominally 
private people have often exercised extraordinary coercive power, even if 
the assemblies have been neither violent, commercial, nor monopolistic. 
Socially prominent religious institutions present one familiar example of 
this phenomenon. At the same time, Inazu never confronts the complex 
character of contemporary government. In our constitutional democracy, 
divided by principles of federalism and the separation of powers and 
further complicated by administrative bureaucracy, railing against ―the 
state‖ raises more questions than it answers. Moreover, Inazu’s exclusion 
of commercial entities from his right of assembly, while instrumentally 
appealing, lacks any apparent theoretical basis and has the effect of 
obscuring the many ways in which concentrations of ―private‖ capital rival 
and undermine government’s coercive authority. These problems may not 
undermine Inazu’s essential conception of assembly, but I think they 
substantially complicate Inazu’s goal of fitting that conception into 
constitutional law. 
Second, as a free speech scholar, I am troubled by Inazu’s rejection of 
expressive association. He makes a strong case that the Court’s expressive 
association doctrine captures too little of what we care about in group 
formation and group identity. But if, as Inazu seems to suggest, we cannot 
meaningfully distinguish expressive associations from other 
associations—if the expressive character of certain associations does not 
imbue them with any constitutionally distinctive value—then I wonder 
how we can sustain free speech doctrine as we know it. After all, 
constitutional protection for expressive freedom depends on the distinction 
between speech and action. That distinction may be unstable or even 
 
 
 22. For my own views on the public-private distinction in First Amendment law, see Gregory P. 
Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of 
Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101 (2004). 
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incoherent, but without it, the First Amendment loses all meaning.
23
 I 
doubt scuttling free speech doctrine was on Inazu’s agenda when he wrote 
Liberty’s Refuge, but his legal analysis points toward that result. Inazu has 
persuaded me that the Court’s formulation of expressive association 
suffers from internal deficiencies and excessive ambitions. Even so, I 
think we should attempt to repair that doctrine, and set it in its proper 
place, before we join Inazu in repudiating it altogether.  
My doubts about some of Inazu’s conclusions actually reinforce my 
appreciation of Liberty’s Refuge. Inazu’s clear prose style and relentless 
intellectual honesty enable and even invite criticism while also forcing 
critics to acknowledge and confront the force of his ideas. Inazu’s avowed 
goal with this book is to start a discussion, and he has achieved that goal 
brilliantly. The present exchange, ―Engaging Liberty’s Refuge,‖ marks a 
ceremonial launch of that discussion, and the discussion will continue and 
expand as the book engages and challenges new readers. 
 
 
 23. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT’S A GOOD 
THING, TOO 105 (1994) (discussing the necessity, and the incoherence, of the speech-action distinction 
in First Amendment doctrine). 
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